Algorithmic Game Theory -

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Editeur : Springer International Publishing Ag

Langue : Anglais

Parution : 01/09/2022

Format : Moyen, de 350g à 1kg

Nombre de pages : 612

Expédition : 914

Dimensions : 23.5 x 15.5 x 3.3

ISBN : 3031157133

Résumé :
This book constitutes the proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022, which took place in Colchester, UK, in September 2022.

The 31 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 83 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Auctions, markets and mechanism design; computational aspects in games; congestion and network creation games; data sharing and learning; social choice and stable matchings.

Sommaire:
Invited Talk.- Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems.- Auctions, Markets and Mechanism Design.- How Bad is the Merger Paradox.- Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism.- Lookahead Auctions with Pooling.- Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents.- On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets.- Explicitly Simple Near-tie Auctions.- Computational Aspects in Games.- Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy.- Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs.- PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Games.- Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games.- Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities.- Automated Equilibrium Analysis of 2 2 2 Games.- Congestion and Network Creation Games.- An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games.- A common generalizationof budget games and congestion games.- Cost-Sharing Games with Rank-Based Utilities.- On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games.- On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games.- Data Sharing and Learning.- Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts.- Coopetition Against an Amazon.- Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents.- Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games.- Social Choice and Stable Matchings.- Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts.- Fair ride allocation on a line.- Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences.- Collective Schedules: Axioms and algorithms.- Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting.- Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment.- Gehrlein Stable Committee with Multi-Modal Preferences. -Online Max-min Fair Allocation.- Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas.- Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams....