Contemporary Debates in Cognitive - Stainton

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Auteur(s) : Stainton

Editeur : John Wiley & Sons

Langue : Anglais

Parution : 01/05/2006

Format : Moyen, de 350g à 1kg

Nombre de pages : 360.0

Expédition : 35

ISBN : 1405113057

Résumé :
This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions.

• The debates are written by renowned experts in the field.
  
• The debates cover the middle ground as well as the extremes
  
• Addresses topics such as the amount of innate knowledge, bounded rationality and the role of perception in action.
  
• Provides valuable overview of the field in a clear and easily comprehensible form.

...

Biographie:
Robert J. Stainton is Associate Professor at the University of Western Ontario. He has published some 40 articles on various topics in linguistics and philosophy, and has authored or edited eight previous books, including Philosophical Perspectives on Language (1996), Knowledge and Mind (2000) and is co-editor of Philosophy and Linguistics (1999)....

Sommaire:

Acknowledgments vii

Notes on Contributors viii

Preface xiii

Just How Modular Is the Mind? 1

1 The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind 3
Peter Carruthers

2 Is the Mind Really Modular? 22
Jesse J. Prinz

3 Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? 37
Richard Samuels

How Much Knowledge of Language Is Innate? 57

4 Irrational Nativist Exuberance 59
Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K. Pullum

5 The Case for Linguistic Nativism 81
Robert J. Matthews

6 On the Innateness of Language 97
James McGilvray

Has Cognitive Science Shown That Human Beings Are Cognitively Bounded, Or Irrational? 113

7 Bounded and Rational 115
Gerd Gigerenzer

8 Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue 134
David Matheson

Are Rules and Representations Necessary To Explain Systematicity? 145

9 Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules 147
Terence Horgan and John Tienson

10 Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective 159
Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel

Can Consciousness and Qualia Be Reduced? 187

11 Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced 189
William G. Lycan

12 Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced 202
Brie Gertler

Does Cognitive Science Need External Content at All? 217

13 Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) 219
Ray Jackendoff

14 The Intentional Inexistence of Language - But Not Cars 237
Georges Rey

Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 257

15 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 259
Kirk Ludwig

16 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the No Side 275
Christopher Viger

Can Mental States, Knowledge in Particular, Be Divided Into a Narrow Component and a Broad Component? 289

17 Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External Components? 291
Timothy Williamson

18 The Internal and External Components of Cognition 307
Ralph Wedgwood

Index 326