Lying and Deception - Carson, Thomas L

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Résumé :

• Introduction and Pr?cis


• PART I: CONCEPTS


• 1: Lying


• Introduction


• 1.1 My Definition of Lying


• 1.I.1: Lies and Falsehoods


• 1.I.2: Falsehoods and Lies


• 1.I.3: A Reformulation of the Dictionary Definitions


• 1.I.4: Lying and the Right to Know the Truth


• 1.I.5: That the Intent to Deceive is not Necessary for Lying


• 1.I.6: Chisholm and Feehan's Definition


• 1.I.7: My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version)


• 1.I.8: A Defence of the Transparency Thesis


• 1.I.9: The Concept of Warranting


• 1.I.10: Conditions for Warranting the Truth of a Statement


• 1.I.11: Yet Another Revision


• 1.I.12: A Complication of My Final Definition


• 1.I.13: Some Comments on this Definition


• 1.I.14: An Objection: The Concept of Assertion
  


• Fried


• Williams


• Chisholm and Feehan


• 1.I.15: Reasons to Accept my Definition


• 1.II Replies to Criticisms of My Definition


• 1.II.1: Sorensen


• 1.II.2: Fallis


• Conclusions


• Endnotes


• 2. Deception and Related Concepts


• Introduction


• 2.I Deception


• 2.I.2: Several Objections and Modified Versions of My Definition


• 2.I.3: Some Considerations Relevant to Later Parts of the Book


• 2.II Keeping Someone in the Dark


• 2.III The Relationship between Lying, Deception, Keeping Someone in the Dark, Concealing Information, and Withholding Information


• 2.III.1: The Difference between Lying and Deception


• 2.III.2: Deception Versus Witholding Information


• 2.III.3: Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception


• 2.IV Two Related Notions: Spin and Half-Truths


• 2.V Bullshit


• 2.V.1: Frankfurt on Bullshit, Deception, and Lying


• 2.V.2: Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth


• 2.V.3: Bullshit Does Not Require the Intention to Deceive


• 2.V.4: Lying Can Constitute Producing Bullshit


• 2.V.5: Bullshitters Can be Concerned with the Truth of What they Say


• 2.VI A Very Brief Note on Honesty


• Endnotes


• PART II: MORAL THEORY


• IIA NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY


• 3. Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying


• Introduction


• 3.I Kant's Categorical Imperative


• 3.I.1: The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative


• 3.I.2: Perfect and Imperfect Duties


• 3.I.3: The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative


• 3.II What Kant Says about the Morality of Lying


• 3.II.1: The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)


• 3.II.2: Metaphysics of Morals (1797)


• 3.II.3: On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns


• 3.II.4: Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of On a Supposed Right...


• 3.II.5: Lectures on Ethics


• 3.III Does the First Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong?


• 3.IV Does the Second Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong?


• 3.V A Rossian Argument for Thinking that Lying is Sometim...

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