Games in Management Science -

Biographie:
Pierre-Olivier Pineau is a full professor in the Department of Decision Sciences at HEC Montr?al and has held the Chair of Energy Sector Management since December 2013. He is a specialist in energy policy, particularly in the electricity sector. His research focuses on the integration of electricity markets in Canada and around the world, as well as optimal approaches to balancing production and energy consumption. He has worked in Finland, Peru and Cameroon on energy policy issues. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Energy Economics Association. He is a member of the CIRODD (Interuniversity Research Center on the Operationalization of Sustainable Development) and a Fellow at CIRANO (Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis of Organizations). Prior to joining HEC Montr?al, he was a professor at the University of Victoria (BC) from 2001 to 2006.

Sommaire:
Chapter 1. A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing.- Chapter 2. On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products.- Chapter 3. The effects of consumer rebates in a competitive distribution channel.- Chapter 4. On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising.- Chapter 5. Product Recalls and Channel Pricing.- Chapter 6. Coordination in Closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns.- Chapter 7. A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime.- Chapter 8. Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market.- Chapter 9. A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics.- Chapter 10. Managerial incentives and polluting inputs under imperfect competition.- Chapter 11. Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game.- Chapter 12. Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework.- Chapter 13. Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games through Environmental Personhood.- Chapter 14. A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players.- Chapter 15. Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market.- Chapter 16. Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium.- Chapter 17. Building E cient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game.- Chapter 18. Game theory and cyber defence.- Chapter 19. A LQ vaccine communication game.- Chapter 20. On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade.- Chapter 21. Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment.