Bombing the European Axis Powers - Davis, Richard G

. .

Résumé :
This undertaking is a work of unusual form. At its core this work is a database covering Anglo- American strategic bomber operations against Germany, Italy, and Axis associated or occupied Europe. As such it allows swift and easy listing of day-by-day bombing, bombing of strategic target systems by location and tonnage, bombing of specific countries, comparisons of US and British targeting and operations, and much more. The work details strategic operations only- B-17 and B-24 bomber sorties by the four US numbered air forces in the European and Mediterranean theaters (Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth) and all bombing sorties for aircraft assigned to the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command and RAF 205 Group. This definition excludes US twin-engine medium bomb groups, which often hit the same aiming points as their four-engine compatriots, but includes twin-engine British Wellington medium bombers and twin-engine British Mosquito, Boston, and Ventura light bombers. Although the US heavy and medium bombers had instances of overlapping, targeting those instances usually fell into areas of what US doctrine defined as tactical rather than strategic bombing, such as frontline troops, transportation facilities feeding the front line, and airfields. US medium bombers did not fly deep into enemy country to attack industrial and strategic targets. The case differed for the RAF. Wellingtons and other medium bombers formed the backbone of the main bombing force from 1940 through late 1942 and throughout 1943 for 205 Group. Bomber Command's shortranged Bostons and Venturas of No. 2 Group raided French ports, power plants, and industrial targets until transferring to Tactical Bomber Force in May 1943. Likewise, Mosquitoes conducted numerous hit-and-run daylight raids until May of 1943 and then switched to night harassing attacks on German population centers, particularly Berlin, until the war's end. Such bombing furthered Bomber Command's campaign against the morale of the German labor force.

Biographie:
Dr. Richard G. Davis is a member of the historical staff at the Army's Center of Military History. He was previously historian for the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea Command. He began his assignment in Korea in May 2001. Before that he served as a senior historian with the USAF Historical Support Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC. He received his BA in history from the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, his MA in European history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and his PhD in military history from George Washington University, Washington, DC. He spent eight years as an archivist in the National Archives where he participated in the declassification of major military, intelligence, and diplomatic records of the US government concerning World War II and Korea. The author joined the USAF History Program in 1980.