Liberal Legality - Lewis Sargentich

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Résumé :
Liberal Legality shows that different kinds of legal argument, rule-based reasoning and reasoning based on principles and policies, share a surprising kinship. The diverse ways of arguing arise from the same root, and they share commitment to secure the rule of law in the service of liberty - liberal legality.

Biographie:
Lewis D. Sargentich is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Massachusetts. He has taught jurisprudence and legal theory courses there for four decades, including seminars on subjects ranging from natural law to legal skepticism.

Sommaire:
1. The idea of law-like law; 2. Argument in a legal system; 3. Practice of legality; 3.1. Instituted discourse; 3.2. Entrenched pursuit; 3.3. Self-conception; 4. Pursuit of the rule of law; 5. Aspiration and impulse; 5.1. Nomological legality; 5.2. Liberal commitment; 5.3. Failure of legality; 5.4. Dual impulse; 6. Deep duality - formal law; 6.1. Rawls' first view of law; 6.2. A contrary view; 6.3. Law-like formality: Weber; 6.4. Half-right views; 7. Deep duality - law's ideals; 7.1. A contrary view; 7.2. Law-like ideals: Dworkin; 7.3. Halves of a whole; 7.4. Rawls' second view of law; 8. Two perils for law; 8.1. Liberal law's fears; 8.2. Overcoming peril; 8.3. Deeper danger; 8.4. What follows; 9. Fear of free ideals; 9.1. Warring creeds; 9.2. Moral skepticism; 9.3. What's feared; 10. Fear of open form: 10.1. Unsure concepts; 10.2. Linguistic skepticism; 10.3. What's feared; 11. Modern liberal practice; 11.1. Practice's view of law; 11.2. Two views of disorder; 11.3. Implications of disorder; 12. Legality recapitulated.