Game Theory - Peters, Hans

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Résumé :
This textbook presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It is the second, revised version of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book contains a problem section. Hints, answersand solutions are included.

Biographie:
Hans Peters studied mathematics at the Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands), where he graduated in 1982. Since 1984 he has been working at Maastricht University, at the Department of Quantitative Economics and the Department of Mathematics. He received his Ph.D. from Radboud University in 1986. He is Professor of Quantitative Economics, in particular Mathematical Economics, at the Department of Quantitative Economics, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University. He is also Honorar Professor at the Rheinisch-Westf?lische Technische Hochschule, Aachen, Germany. He is a Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory SAET. His main research interests are game theory and social choice theory, and he is currently an editor of Social Choice and Welfare, Games and Economic Behavior, and Mathematical Social Sciences, and main editor of the Theory and Decision Library Series C: Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization,published by Springer (http://www.springer.com/series/6618)....

Sommaire:

Introduction.- Part I Thinking Strategically.- Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Games.- Finite Two-Person Games.- Finite Extensive Form Games.- Finite Games with Incomplete Information.- Noncooperative Games: Extensions.- Repeated Games.- An Introduction to Evolutionary Games.- Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility.- Cooperative Game Models.- Social Choice.- Part II Noncooperative Games.- Matrix Games.- Finite Games.- Extensive Form Games.- Evolutionary Games.- Part III Cooperative Games.- TU-Games: Dominationa, Stable Sets, and the Core.- The Shapley Value.- Core, Shapley Value, and Weber Set.- The Nucleolus.- Special Transferable Utility Games.- Bargaining Problems.- Part IV Tools.