Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence - Gehrlein, William V.

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Résumé :
The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters? preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters? preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters? preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.

Biographie:
with a primary focus on social choice theory. He has authored more than 150 publications, along with several books and edited volumes. Dr. Dominique Lepelley received his Ph.D in Economics from the University of Caen. He is currently Professor at the University of La R?union (France). He is primarily interested in social choice theory. More specifically, his work examines the properties of voting procedures and electoral systems. He served as a member of the editorial board of the journal Social Choice and Welfare and has authored more than 80 publications, including two books and one edited volume....

Sommaire:
Dr. William V. Gehrlein is currently Professor Emeritus at University of Delaware (US), which he has been affiliated with since 1978. He has received a number of grants and awards, and has served on two journal editorial boards. His research interests have spanned the topics of statistics, operations management, and graph theory...