Moral Rightness - Haslett, David

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Résumé :
I. Confirming Answers to Moral Questions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Right and the Good According to Lewis.- 3. Evaluative Sentences Analyzed.- 4. Ambiguities in Moral Questions.- II. Toward an Approach to Ethical Justification.- 5. Lewis' Approach to Ethical Justification.- 6. Rationality as More Than Consistency.- 7. An Initial Look at Another Approach.- 8. What is Intrinsically Good and Why: The Outline of an Argument.- 9. Justification and Morality Enforcement.- III. The Fundamental Imperative of Rationality.- 10. Absolute, Objective, and Subjective Rationality.- 11. The Ideal Observer Standpoint.- 12. Rationality Where Probabilities Differ.- 13. The Rationale.- 14. Rationality, Prudential Goodness, and an Alleged Paradox.- IV. The Maximum Social Goodness Imperative.- 15. The Golden Rule.- 16. Social Goodness Defined.- 17. What Counts as an Act.- 18. The General Use.- 19. The General Use as Morally Fundamental.- V. The Ideal Observer Moral Code.- 20. The Ideal Observer Criterion.- 21. The Need for Simplicity, Ease of Application, and Uniformity.- 22. Exceptions to the Rules.- 23. Borderline Cases.- 24. Conflicting Rules.- 25. A Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism.- 26. A Comparison with the Ideal Moral Code Criterion.- VI. The Plausibility of Justification.- 27. A Foreword on Justice.- 28. The Ideal Observer Moral Code vs. a Discriminatory Moral Code.- 29. Final Formulation of the Approach to Justification.- 30. Conclusion.- Works Referred To....

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Sommaire:
I. Confirming Answers to Moral Questions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Right and the Good According to Lewis.- 3. Evaluative Sentences Analyzed.- 4. Ambiguities in Moral Questions.- II. Toward an Approach to Ethical Justification.- 5. Lewis' Approach to Ethical Justification.- 6. Rationality as More Than Consistency.- 7. An Initial Look at Another Approach.- 8. What is Intrinsically Good and Why: The Outline of an Argument.- 9. Justification and Morality Enforcement.- III. The Fundamental Imperative of Rationality.- 10. Absolute, Objective, and Subjective Rationality.- 11. The Ideal Observer Standpoint.- 12. Rationality Where Probabilities Differ.- 13. The Rationale.- 14. Rationality, Prudential Goodness, and an Alleged Paradox.- IV. The Maximum Social Goodness Imperative.- 15. The Golden Rule.- 16. Social Goodness Defined.- 17. What Counts as an Act.- 18. The General Use.- 19. The General Use as Morally Fundamental.- V. The Ideal Observer Moral Code.- 20. The Ideal Observer Criterion.- 21. The Need for Simplicity, Ease of Application, and Uniformity.- 22. Exceptions to the Rules.- 23. Borderline Cases.- 24. Conflicting Rules.- 25. A Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism.- 26. A Comparison with the Ideal Moral Code Criterion.- VI. The Plausibility of Justification.- 27. A Foreword on Justice.- 28. The Ideal Observer Moral Code vs. a Discriminatory Moral Code.- 29. Final Formulation of the Approach to Justification.- 30. Conclusion.- Works Referred To.