To Queue or Not to Queue - Haviv, Moshe

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Résumé :
PSTRONGTo Queue Or Not To Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems /STRONGfocuses on the highly interesting, practical viewpoint of customer behavior and its effect on the performance of the queueing system. The book's objectives are threefold: (1) It is a comprehensive survey of the literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in queueing systems. The literature is rich and considerable, but lacks continuity. This book will provide the needed continuity and cover some issues that have not been adequately treated. (2) In addition, it will examine the known results of the field, classify them and identify where and how they relate to each other. (3) And finally, it seeks to fill a number of the gaps in the literature with new results while explicitly outlining open problems in other areas. With this book, it is the authors' paramount purpose is to motivate further research and to help researchers identify new and interesting open problems. /P

Sommaire:
1. Introduction.- 1.1 Basic concepts.- 1.2 Threshold strategies.- 1.3 Costs and objectives.- 1.4 Queueing theory preliminaries.- 1.5 A shuttle example.- 1.6 Non-stochastic models.- 2. Observable Queues.- 2.1 Naor's model.- 2.2 The LCFS-PR model.- 2.3 Social optimization.- 2.4 Profit maximization.- 2.5 Heterogeneous customers.- 2.6 Non-FCFS queues without reneging.- 2.7 Discounting.- 2.8 State dependent pricing.- 2.9 Waiting for the right server.- 2.10 Non-exponential service requirements.- 2.11 Related literature.- 3. Unobservable Queues.- 3.1 Identical customers.- 3.2 Observable vs. unobservable queues.- 3.3 Heterogeneous service values.- 3.4 Heterogeneous service values and time costs.- 3.5 Customers know their demand.- 3.6 Finite buffer.- 3.7 Multi-server models.- 3.8 Queueing networks.- 3.9 Related literature.- 4. Priorities.- 4.1 Observable queues.- 4.2 Unobservable queues.- 4.3 Discriminatory processor sharing.- 4.4 Incentive compatible prices.- 4.5 Bribes and auctions.- 4.6 Class decision.- 4.7 Related literature.- 5. Reneging and Jockeying.- 5.1 Reneging in observable queues.- 5.2 Reneging in unobservable queues.- 5.3 Jockeying.- 5.4 Related literature.- 6. Schedules and Retrials.- 6.1 Waiting time auctions.- 6.2 ?/M/1.- 6.3 Arrivals to scheduled batch service.- 6.4 Retrials.- 6.5 Related literature.- 7. Competition among Servers.- 7.1 Unobservable queues with heterogeneous time values.- 7.2 Unobservable queues with heterogeneous values of service.- 7.3 Observable queues.- 7.4 Price and priority competition.- 7.5 Search among competing servers.- 7.6 Information based competition.- 7.7 Related literature.- 8. Service Rate Decisions.- 8.1 Heterogeneous service values.- 8.2 Service rate at a fixed price.- 8.3 Bribes and auctions.- 8.4 Asymmetric information.- 8.5Observable vs. unobservable queues.- 8.6 Co-production.- 8.7 Competition among servers.- 8.8 Capacity expansion.- 8.9 Related literature.

From the reviews: The book enriches the literature on equilibrium of customers and servers in queuing systems, and it reviews the existing literature. On the other hand, it edits the known results in a unified way, and mentions some open problems. ... The book presents a fresh introduction to queuing theory. ... The nice book is welcome in the realm of queuing world. (Anatolij Dvurecenskij, Zentralblatt MATH, Vol. 1064 (15), 2005)