Reasoning with Attitude - Julian J Schlöder

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Résumé :

• List of Figures
• Preface
• 1 Expressivism
• 1.1 Semantics, postsemantics and meta-semantics
• 1.2 Why expressivism?
• 1.3 Speaker subjectivism
• 1.4 Traditional expressivism
• 1.5 Attitude expression
• 1.6 The Frege--Geach Problem
• 1.7 Sophisticated expressivism
• 1.8 The Many Attitudes Problem
• 1.9 The Wishful Thinking Problem
• 1.10 The Problem of Creeping Minimalism
• 2 Inferentialism
• 2.1 Inferentialist semantics
• 2.2 From semantics to meta-semantics and back
• 2.3 Why inferentialism?
• 2.4 The Problem of Defective Concepts
• 2.5 The Problem of Constitutive Rules
• 2.6 The Problem of Limited Applicability
• 3 Inferential Expressivism
• 3.1 Traditional expressivism about negation
• 3.2 Bilateralism and Frege--Geach
• 3.3 Inferential expressivism
• 3.4 Mixed inferences and Frege--Geach
• 3.5 Evidence and the problem of weak rejections
• 3.6 From bilateralism to multilateralism
• 3.7 Linguistic realization of strong rejection
• 3.8 Appendix
• 4 Epistemic Modals
• 4.1 Traditional expressivism about might
• 4.2 Might and perhaps
• 4.3 Weak assertion
• 4.4 Coordinating the speech acts
• 4.5 The meaning of might
• 4.6 Weak assertions, epistemic modal assertions, and evidence
• 4.7 Frege--Geach and its revenge version
• 4.8 Modal disagreement and Yalcinean sentences
• 4.9 Appendix
• 5 Moral Vocabulary
• 5.1 The Negation Problem
• 5.2 Bilateralism and the Negation Problem
• 5.3 Disapproval and moral vocabulary
• 5.4 Schroeder and the Negation Problem
• 5.5 Wishful thinking and evidence
• 5.6 Moral Moorean sentences
• 5.7 Moral motivation
• 6 Attitudes
• 6.1 Many attitudes, few contents
• 6.2 Expressing many attitudes
• 6.3 Ascribing many attitudes
• 6.4 Having many attitudes
• 6.5 Semantics in its proper place
• 7 Truth
• 7.1 Traditional expressivism about truth
• 7.2 The meaning of the truth predicate
• 7.3 Evidence and the truth rules
• 7.4 The truth predicate in multilateral logic
• 7.5 Truth and supervaluation
• 7.6 Classical recapture and revenge
• 7.7 Rejectability and revenge
• 7.8 Epistemic Liars
• 7.9 The question of realism
• 7.10 Appendix
• 8 Conditionals
• 8.1 Binary speech acts
• 8.2 Frege--Geach for conditionals
• 8.3 Counterfactuals and counterepistemics
• 8.4 The Gibbard Collapse Argument
• 8.5 Generalised Yalcinean sentences
• 8.6 Curry's Paradox
• 8.7 Content conditionals and inferential conditionals
• 8.8 On the plurality of conditionals
• 9 Probability
• 9.1 Traditional expressivism about probable
• 9.2 Probable and probably
• 9.3 Moderate assertion and moderate rejection
• 9.4 Coordination principles
• 9.5 Operational rules
• 9.6 Evidence and probability
• 9.7 Inferential expressivism about probability
• 9.8 Gradability
• 9.9 Moss on probabilistic belief
• 10 The Road Ahead
• Bibliography
• Index