Representation And Reality - hilary putnam

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Résumé :
The author, one of the first philosophers to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radical view of his own theory of functionalism in this book.

Sommaire:
Part 1 Meaning and mentalism: Fodor and Chomsky; three reasons why mentalism can't be right; connections between 1,2, and 3. Part 2 Meaning, other people and the world: the division of linguistic labour; elms, beeches and searle; the contribution of the environment; an indexical component; other natural kinds; references and theory change; meaning and Mental Representation. Part 3 Fodor and Block on Narrow Content: narrow content as a Function of Observable Properties; Narrow Content and Conceptual Role; concluding remarks. Part 4 Are there such things as reference and truth?: why Folk Psychology and not Folk Logic?; disquotation, anyone?; the Semantical Conception of truth; disquotation as disappearance. Part 5 Why functionalism didn't work: sociofunctionalism; what In Principle means here; the single-computational-state version of functionalism; equivalence; surveying rationality. Part 6 Other forms of functionalism: David Lewis and I; Lewis's theory further examined; conclusion. Part 7 A sketch of an alternative picture: objectivity and conceptual relativity; internal realism as an alternative picture; my present diagnosis of the Functionalism issue.

With striking candor, Putnam exposes the factors that have shaped his thinking about intentionality. Since that thinking has had a great influence, this book is full of valuable insights into current philosophical methods, foibles, and aspirations. As usual, he sets a hard task for his colleagues: figuring out how to agree with just 90 percent of what he says.--Daniel Dennett, Tufts University